NATIONAL ENERGY REGULATOR OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reason for Decision (RfD)

In the matter regarding

Grid Capacity Allocation Rules

DECISION

Based on the available information and analysis conducted on Grid Capacity Allocation Rules at its meeting held on 12 November 2025, the Energy Regulator decided as follows:

1. To Approve:

   1.1 the Grid Capacity Allocation Rules (attached as Annexure A); and

   1.2 the Reasons for Decision (RfD) document.

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DEFINITIONS

In this Reason for Decision (RfD) document, any word or expression to which a meaning has been assigned, shall have a meaning so assigned and, unless the context otherwise indicates.

Act	The Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 (Act No. 4 of 2006), as amended or re-enacted from time to time.
Applicant	A legal entity or third party applying to a transmission or distribution licensee for access to that licensee's Network.
Budget Quotation	The provision of financial terms and physical supply conditions with the confidence level of 85%, subject to certain conditions negotiated between the participants. The customer may pay more if the stipulated conditions cannot be met or pay less if the actual costs are less than those quoted.
Capacity	The amount of power that can be reliably transmitted through the network or component thereof, whether serving loads or accepting generation, without exceeding the technical limits of any network component or compromising system operation resulting in potential grid instability.
Codes	The South African Grid Code, the Distribution Code, or any other code approved by NERSA, as may be applicable.
Consumer	A user of electricity (person or legal entity) that has entered into an agreement with a licensed electricity distributor
Distribution power system	A power system operating at or below 132kV.
Electricity Pricing Policy	Electricity Pricing Policy, dated 12 December 2008, including subsequent amendments thereto.

Electricity supply industry	The import, export, generation, transmission, distribution, system operation and trading of electricity and all activities related thereto, and for purposes of the Rules, includes investors looking to invest in industry infrastructure.
Grid access	The process of connecting electricity generators, as well as consumers, to the Transmission and Distribution power systems. A crucial element of this access process is that renewable energy generated not only enters the grid but is also allowed to be dispatched and sold according to the relevant grid connection rules and codes.
Network	The Transmission or Distribution power system, as may be applicable.
Network Service Provider	A legal entity that is licensed to provide network services through the ownership and maintenance of an electricity network.
Transmission Power System	A network for the conveyance of electricity which operates above a nominal voltage of 132kV including assets that are approved by the Regulator to be part of the transmission power system

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BQ	Budget Quotation
CEL	Cost Estimate Letter
COD	Commercial Operation Date
EPC	Engineering, Procurement and Construction
ER	Energy Regulator
ESI	Electricity Supply Industry
IGCAR	Interim Grid Capacity Allocation Rules
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IPP	Independent Power Producer
JET	Just Energy Transition
NERA	National Energy Regulator Act
NERSA	National Energy Regulator of South Africa
NSP	Network Service Providers

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. A transmission or distribution licensee must, to the extent provided for in the licence, provide non-discriminatory access to its Transmission or Distribution power system to Applicants who meet the requirements to facilitate investment in the electricity supply industry and to promote competitiveness and customer and end user choice

1.2. Grid access refers to the process of connecting electricity generators, as well as consumers, to the transmission and distribution power systems. A crucial element of this access process is that renewable energy generated not only enters the grid but is also allowed to be dispatched and sold according to the relevant grid connection rules and codes.

1.3. As demand for electricity generation rises and the shift from fossil fuels to renewable sources continues, it is essential to have well-defined policies and rules that protect grid access matters. These rules ensure fairness and consistency in their implementation.

1.4. However, available grid connection capacity is becoming increasingly limited, particularly at the substation level and throughout the western part of the country. This scarcity highlights the need for regulatory measures to establish structured rules for grid capacity allocation

1.5. In the past, licensees allocated grid capacity on a first-come, first-served (fc-fs) basis. However, as the demand for electricity generation increased and the shift from fossil fuels to renewable sources continues, it has become clear that the process of allocating grid capacity should be refined further to ensure efficient distribution and to minimize the risk of speculators monopolising the grid without a genuine commitment to fostering investment.

1.6. In response to the need for effective grid management, NERSA has developed the Grid Capacity Allocation Rules. These rules aim to ensure a balanced allocation of grid capacity among all applicants, which is important for maintaining long-term

energy security. Implementing non-discriminatory access is expected to improve customer options for affordable and reliable electricity supply.

1.7. These rules will apply to all NSP to ensure that consistent consideration is given to factors such as the period of consideration and the expiration of such access rights.

2. LEGAL MANDATE

2.1 The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) is a regulatory authority established as a juristic person in terms of section 3 of the National Energy Regulator Act, 2004 (Act No. 40 of 2004) (NERA).

2.2 NERSA's mandate is to regulate the electricity, piped-gas and petroleum pipeline industries in terms of the Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 (Act No. 4 of 2006), Gas Act, 2001 (Act No. 48 of 2001) and Petroleum Pipelines Act, 2003 (Act No. 60 of 2003).

2.3 Section 2A of the Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 (Act No.4 of 2006), as amended ('the Act') confirms that the Act is applicable to the generation, transmission, distribution, reticulation, system operation, trading, and import and export, of electricity activities, and to persons undertaking such activities.

2.4 In terms of section 3 of the Act, the Energy Regulator ('the ER') is the custodian and enforcer of the regulatory framework provided for in the Act and has regulatory authority over persons undertaking activities, which are subject to the Act. Therefore, the ER is entrusted to ensure that the objectives of the Act are achieved.

2.5 The ER is obliged, in terms of section 4(a)(iv) of the Act, to issue rules designed to implement the national government's electricity policy framework, the integrated resource plan and this Act.

2.6 Section 35(1) of the Act empowers the ER to make rules, guidelines, directives and codes of conduct and practice after consultation with licensees, municipalities that reticulate electricity and such other interested persons as may be necessary.

2.7 Section 35 (3) of the Act further provides that, without derogating from the general nature of the empowerment, the ER make rules which relate to (c) the security, operation, use and maintenance of Transmission and Distribution power systems and (k) any other ancillary or administrative matter for which it is necessary to make rules for the proper implementation of this Act.

2.8 Policy position 5 of the Electricity Pricing Policy of 2008 details the circumstances under which access must be provided to all users, which aligns with the provisions of section 21 of ERA, which requires transmission and distribution licensee to provide non-discriminatory access to its Transmission or Distribution power system to third parties.

2.9 In the development of delegated or subordinate legislation, the following interactive factors play a role in enabling the legality of such subordinate legislation:

a) The extent to which the discretion of the delegated authority is structured and guided by the enabling legislation.

b) The public importance and constitutional significance of the measures.

c) The shortness of the period to develop such subordinate legislation.

d) The extent to which the subject matter necessitates the use of forms for rapid intervention, which could otherwise be slow and inhibit other processes.

2.10 The justification for having the rule-making powers vested in administrative bodies, such as NERSA, is based on numerous practical considerations, including the following:

a) The technical nature of financial regulation and the degree to which specialist knowledge is needed for effective rule making.

b) The importance of the time factor in addressing matters where rapid intervention is critical.

c) Issues on which regulations are made are more often than not of a non-political, administrative/technical nature.

d) Best practice in other jurisdictions indicate that rule-making powers are vested in administrative authorities/bodies rather than in political office-bearers.

e) Rules are subject to the ultra vires rule which means that they may be struck down by a court if not authorised in the enabling Act.

2.11 To meet the legality requirement, the ER has ensured that the appropriate powers have been exercised to ascertain jurisdictional fact and satisfy the stakeholder consultation legal requirements.

3. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

3.1. On 26 June 2025, the Energy Regulator approved the publication of the NERSA Consultation Paper on draft Grid Capacity Allocation Rules.

3.2. On 27 June 2025, NERSA published the consultation paper on the NERSA website, 𝕏 (formerly known as twitter), Facebook. The consultation paper was also advertised on the Sowetan, Business News, and Sunday Times newspapers requesting stakeholders to submit written comments, the closing date for stakeholder comments was 29 July 2025.

3.3. The public hearing was held on 08 August 2025 on Microsoft Teams.

4. STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

4.1. NERSA received comments from Thirty-three (33) stakeholders Shown in table 1 below:

Table 1 Stakeholders with written comments

1. Renenergy	12. Apollo Trading Company (Pty) Ltd	23. RED ROCKET
2. African Clean Energy Developments (Pty) Ltd	13. NECOM	24. The Energy Intensive Users Group of Southern Africa (EIUG)
3. One Partner (Pty) Ltd	14. Eskom	25. Mulilo
4. Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)	15. GreenCo Power Services Proprietary Limited (GreenCo)	26. Envusa Energy (Pty) Ltd
5. Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)	16. Cobra Industrial Services (Pty) Lt	27. Enertrag
6. Mainstream Renewable Power Developments (Pty) Ltd	17. South African Photovoltaic Industry Association (SAPVIA)	28. IPP Office
7. G7 Renewable Energies (Pty) Ltd	18. EDF	29. NTCSA
8. Terra Firma Solutions (Pty) Ltd	19. Globeleq	30. South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA)
9. South African Independent Power Producers Association (SAIPPA)	20. The SOLA Group (SOLA)	31. NOA Group Holdings Proprietary Limited
10. Energy Council of South Africa	21. City of Cape Town	32. Solar Africa Energy Pty Ltd
11. Sasol	22. Carmel Solar 1 (Pty) Ltd	33. Energy Council of South Africa

4.2. Eight (8) organisations made oral presentations at the public hearing that was held on 08 August 2025 as indicated on **Table 2** below:

Table 2 Stakeholders with oral presentations

1. Lungiswa Energy Pty Ltd	2. G7 Energies
3. SAIPPA	4. Energy Council of South Africa on behalf of BUSA
5. NOA Group	6. Eskom
7. SALGA and AMEU	8. SAWEA

4.3. The stakeholder comments (written and verbal) were considered in this RfD and summarised in section 5 below; and detailed stakeholder feedback is captured in **Annexure C**.

5. ASPECTS OF GRID CAPACITY ALLOCATION RULES DISCUSSED IN THE CONSULTATION PAPER

5.1. The main aspects of the draft Grid Capacity Allocation Rules discussed in the consultation paper included the following:

i. Principles of the Grid Capacity Allocation Rules;
ii. Connection process requirements;
iii. The queuing procedure; and
iv. Legal mandate

5.2. Four questions were posed to stakeholders to solicit their views on the draft rules.

PRINCIPLES OF THE GRID CAPACITY ALLOCATION RULES

5.3. The principles are designed to ensure that everyone has fair access to the grid, promote competition through unbiased access, and protect the interests of current customers. They establish compliance with the Grid Code regarding technical standards and highlight a transparent process for facilitating new connections while addressing capacity constraints. Furthermore, these principles guide NSPs in how they can charge for costs associated with providing network capacity information. By allowing reasonable fees for such requests, the principles aim to foster a more balanced and efficient energy market.

5.4. In line with these principles, stakeholders were invited to share their thoughts on whether the non-discriminatory access principle should follow a first-come, first-served model or if there are alternative approaches that the Energy Regulator should consider.

Stakeholder comments

5.5. Most stakeholders support first-ready, first- served principle due to limited grid capacity and the fact that this will avoid grid capacity being tied up by stalled projects. Some stakeholders conditionally support the first-ready, first- served but indicates that it should have clear readiness thresholds i.e. clear milestones for both IPPs and NSPs.

5.6. Stakeholders also indicated that the first ready first served principle will ensure fair and fast deployment. Some stakeholders also warned that unready projects block progress and Just Energy Transition (JET) goals.

5.7. The stakeholders provided the following recommendations on the first-ready, first-served criteria:

a) Definition of readiness to be prescribed by the rules.

b) first-ready, first-served will undermine the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) because municipalities normally face procurement delays and funding limitations.

NERSA analysis

5.8. The “first ready, first served” principle is fundamental to ensuring the fair, transparent, and efficient allocation of limited grid capacity, while promoting timely project development and preventing any single participant from monopolising access to the grid. Section 4 of the enhanced Rules provides the definition of the “First Ready” principle and outlines the criteria for determining project readiness.

5.9. The IDP is a 5-year strategic plan developed in approximately 6 to 9 months for the new council’s term and is reviewed annually to ensure alignment with budgets, changing needs and circumstances. The IDP forms the basis of Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan once council has adopted it. NERSA is of the view that the first-ready, first-served principle will not undermine the IDPs within various municipalities as the projects and programmes identified in the IDP should be aligned with the municipal resources and capacity. The Rules are designed to ensure a fair, transparent, and balanced allocation of grid capacity to all Applicants, they are not intended to align with or be contingent upon processes outside capacity allocation that Applicants may undertake to obtain grid access.

GRID CAPACITY ALLOCATION PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

5.10. The Draft Rules proposed that the connection process will require an Applicant to submit to the relevant NSP the proof of project readiness, in a form of construction date, supplementary regulatory approvals and clearance documents, necessary contracts to show that construction is or will be in place on time, completeness of designs, construction duration and reasonableness thereof and completeness of financial agreements.

5.11. Stakeholders were invited to provide comments on the adequacy and relevance of the connection process requirements.

Stakeholder comments

5.12. Almost all stakeholders rejected the inclusion of readiness requirements/criteria that include construction start date and duration, necessary contract for construction and completeness of designs because they were not objectifiable parameters in the grid capacity allocation space.

5.13. These majority of stakeholders proposed that connection process should be changed into grid allocation process and include three stage criteria for assessing readiness i.e. Prefeasibility, Reservation, and Allocation.

5.14. Other stakeholders proposed for the inclusion of the reasonable process for revoking allocation in the Rules.

NERSA analysis

5.15. NERSA considered the concerns raised by majority stakeholders around the readiness criteria in the Draft Rules in that they are not pre-requisite for grid capacity allocation and are misaligned with project development. The designs and project construction are typically executed after the grid access is confirmed and connection agreements are finalized through the capacity allocation stage.

5.16. Furthermore, if developers will be expected to enter into binding agreements with Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractors before knowing whether their projects can proceed. That will introduce uncertainty that may hinder investments and may favour the most capitalised entities and undermine the broader objective of facilitating a fair balance between the interests of customers and end users, licensees, investors in the electricity supply industry and the public.

5.17. As a result, NERSA removed the requirements for designs and construction contracts and replaced them with the following three milestone-based

conditions that are encompassed by three stages of grid capacity allocation process. These include pre-feasibility, capacity reservation and capacity allocation as outlined in **Error! Reference source not found.** below:

Figure 1: Grid capacity allocation process.

5.18. The three stages in the grid allocation process outlined in Figure 1 will prevent subjective interpretation by NSPs as the core purpose of the allocation process is to support the principle of first-ready, first-served that ensures non-discriminatory access to grid allocation as the key objective that ensures that grid capacity is allocated to projects that are sufficiently advanced to proceed without delay.

5.19. In this regard, an NSP's role will be to verify whether the Applicant meets the threshold of readiness and to process all compliant applications without requiring the legal, financial and commercial expertise to interpret the grid allocation process.

5.20. The threshold of readiness was also introduced in the Rules to support the three stages of the grid capacity allocation process. An NSP will be required to use the readiness criteria prescribed in the Rules to move projects from one stage to the next. The threshold of readiness is based on go or no-go criteria based on the requirements listed in each stage.

5.21. The readiness criteria were introduced in the Rules because that not all applications will reach construction, due to a number of reasons, including:

a) Project feasibility failure due to insufficient resources and/or environmental constraints.

b) Failure to raise capital.

c) Lack of offtakers maybe due to tariffs for a plant being too high.

5.22. Therefore, the sequencing of grid capacity allocation process elaborated in the readiness criteria reflects the actual project development and reduces risks of inconsistencies, unintended barriers and competitive distortions that may inhibit project implementation and finalisation.

5.23. NERSA considered stakeholders' request that the Rules should cater for revocations, and it included a section that deals with revocations of grid capacity allocation to avoid grid hogging and to eliminate projects that do not comply with the communicated milestone deadlines through no fault of an NSP.

5.24. Revoking grid capacity that was allocated to a project will be done in accordance with conditions outlined either in the CEL, BQ, implementation and/or connection agreements. NSP will be required to develop its own specific procedures and standards for connection that comply with the Act, Electricity Pricing Policy, Rules, Grid Code, and NRS 047. Such requirements must allow the relevant NSP to reserve the right to revoke any grid capacity allocated to a particular project or to reassign it to a different project if the Applicant fails to meet the specified readiness criteria specified in **Error! R eference source not found.** and conditions stipulated in the BQ, connection agreements, or other related documents.

5.25. however, an NSP will not be allowed to revoke grid capacity due to force majeure events.

THE QUEUING PROCEDURE

5.26. In the draft rules the NSPs were required to develop a fair and transparent queuing procedure to address multiple applications to ensure equitable treatment of all Applicants

5.27. Stakeholders were invited to share their thoughts on the issue of transparency and indicate if the procedure should go to the extent of disclosing who is in the queue and what position the Applicant is holding in the queue.

Stakeholder comments

5.28. All stakeholders indicated support for greater transparency in the grid capacity queuing process, emphasising its importance in ensuring fairness, improving efficiency, and restoring trust in the allocation system.

5.29. Stakeholders further recommended transparent queuing and allocation processes to prevent manipulation, monopolization and discrimination.

5.30. There is broad agreement that queue-related information should be publicly disclosed, particularly project-specific data such as location, size, status, and position in the queue. However, stakeholders also emphasised the need to protect commercial confidentiality, particularly regarding Applicant identities, especially at early development stages.

5.31. The following are recommendations from some of the stakeholders regarding queuing:

a) A standardised queuing system with regular public updates with transparent queuing principles prescribed by NERSA.

b) NSPs to disclose who is in the queue and what position each Applicant holds in a queue, without discloser of sensitive information.

c) NERSA should outline a clear and fair process for revoking allocations and specify in the rules how revocations will be handled.

d) Special dispensation for strategic projects should be allowed by the rules.

e) Readiness requirements may not relate to commercial arrangements around the project and projects that are ready should be on the queue.

f) Use it or lose it principle was recommended.

NERSA analysis

5.32. The Rules have been revised to clearly define the queuing process to be implemented by NSPs, comprising three stages: project registration, capacity reservation, and capacity allocation. The process defines how applications are assessed and how they may move up or down the queue at each stage.

5.33. The Rules also provide guidance on project requirements for inclusion in the readiness queue and on the criteria governing movement within it. They specify the obligations applicants must meet to maintain their position and the conditions under which an allocated position may be forfeited. The Rules have also been enhanced to request NSPs to publicise queue information, clearly indicating which information should be made public. Publishing selected queue information promotes transparency, helps developers assess and avoid grid congested areas, supports fair competition, and deters speculative project entries.

5.34. However, keeping certain details such as developer identities and financial terms confidential is prudent to protect commercial interests, maintain a level playing field, and prevent unfair competitive tactics. In order to ensure accountability without compromising sensitive business information, the Rules mandate certain key information to be publicised taking in to account the PAIA and POPIA legislative requirements.

5.35. In countries like the U.S and the UK, NSPs make the queue information public, however, the U.S does not disclose information such as the project name and commercial information. In countries such as India, Brazil and Australia, there is partial disclosure of information about projects in the queue.

5.36. In most cases, the information that is not disclosed includes financial details and full identity information, while the information that is typically disclosed

includes queue position, project type (solar, wind, storage), MW capacity, grid zone, milestones met or missed, queue length, allocation windows, and estimated in-service year.

5.37. Therefore, requesting NSPs to disclose certain queue information is aligned with best practice.

LEGAL MANDATE

5.38. NSPs are required to give non-discriminatory access to the grid and such powers emanate either from their licence conditions and/or from section 21(4) of the ERA which states that access in terms of subsection (3) must be provided on the conditions set out in the licence of such transmitter or distributor that relates to circumstances under which access must be granted or be refused.

5.39. Considering the above, the question below was asked to ensure that licensees understand their roles in developing conditions (not Rules) under which access must be granted or be refused.

5.40. This question also intended to give more clarity in terms of the powers of the Regulator as Eskom had already developed its IGCAR that were widely accepted by the ESI.

5.41. Stakeholders were invited to share their thoughts whether they think it is the responsibility of NSPs to develop the Grid Capacity Allocation Rules and submit them to the Energy Regulator for approval in terms of section 4(a)(vii) which states that enforce performance and compliance with this Act and licence conditions imposed by the Regulator in terms of this Act, and take appropriate steps in the case of non-performance or non-compliance.

Stakeholder comments

5.42. Most stakeholders indicated that NERSA must develop the rules but NSPs can develop processes, policies and procedures that are compliant with the NERSA rules.

5.43. Few stakeholders are of the view that NERSA has a mandate to develop a broader framework outlining key regulatory principles for the rules hence it is the stakeholder's view that licensees need to develop detailed rules, policies, processes and procedures for implementation within the bounds of the policy framework.

5.44. The stakeholders further indicated that Regulatory oversight is maintained to ensure fairness, transparency, and alignment with national energy policy. Furthermore, the stakeholder indicated that this is consistent with best practices worldwide where Regulators hold ultimate authority and oversight concerning the binding policy framework, while the NSPs are responsible for mechanisms to give effect to practical implementation such as processes and procedures, within the approved regularity framework.

5.45. Majority of stakeholders believe that NERSA is legally mandated to develop and enforce Grid Capacity Allocation Rules, not the NSPs.

5.46. NTCSA is of the view that NERSA has a mandate to develop broader framework outlining key regulatory principle for the rules, while the Licensees need to develop detailed policies, processes and procedures for implementation within the bound of the broader NERSA framework.

NERSA analysis

5.47. NERSA agrees with majority of the stakeholders that the ER is obliged in terms of section 4(a)(iv) of the Act, to issue rules designed to implement the national government's electricity policy framework, the integrated resource plan and this Act.

5.48. NERSA also agrees that as stipulated in section 35(1) of the Act, the ER is empowered to make rules, guidelines, directives and codes of conduct and practice after consultation with licensees, municipalities that reticulates electricity and such other interested persons as it may be necessary.

5.49. Section 35(3)(c) further empowers the ER to make rules which relate to the security, operation, use and maintenance of Transmission and Distribution

power systems, and (k) any other ancillary or administrative matter for which it is necessary to make rules for proper implementation of this Act.

5.50. There is broad support from stakeholders for a centralized, transparent, and legally enforceable rules set by NERSA to ensure fairness, consistency, and non-discriminatory access to the grid, The Rules were enhanced in section 9 that " NSPs are subject to the enforcement of these rules in accordance with the licence conditions, and compliance will be strictly monitored and enforced by NERSA".

OTHER STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

5.51. Other stakeholders raised the following additional concerns and recommendations regarding the Grid Capacity Allocation Rules:

6.1.1 Requested that the Rules should safeguard the grid by considering the impact of different technologies on grid stability.

6.1.2 Proposed that the Rules should account for delays in municipal procurement processes to ensure equitable grid access.

6.1.3 Suggested that the Rules should enable smaller and community-based projects to access the grid to prevent dominance by financially stronger entities.

6.1.4 Some stakeholders requested the removal of high-voltage thresholds in the Rules to include lower voltages.

NERSA analysis

6.1.5 NERSA disagreed with the inclusion of technology-specific considerations in the Rules, stating that the feasibility studies conducted in the Connection Evaluation Letter (CEL) and compliance with the Grid Code are adequate to manage grid stability.

6.1.6 NERSA opposes special dispensation for municipal delays, as it would promote discriminatory access and violate the principle of non-discriminatory grid access.

6.1.7 NERSA rejects preferential treatment for community-based projects, emphasising that all projects must follow the principle of non-discriminatory access. However, smaller projects may benefit from proportional guarantees based on their size and can also consider exemptions under the Licensing Exemption and Registration Notice (Schedule 2 Notice).

6.1.8 NERSA has not introduced a voltage threshold in the Rules, as they focus solely on grid capacity allocation aspects.

6.1.9 Overall, NERSA maintained its stance on non-discriminatory access and fairness, ensuring that all projects, regardless of size or type, are treated equally under the Rules.

6. CONFIDENTIALITY

There are no confidentiality issues.

7. CONCLUSION

In compliance with the requirements of the National Energy Regulator Act, 2004 (Act No.40 of 2004) as amended and based on the reasons for the decision provided above, having considered the stakeholder comments provided during the public consultation process, where most stakeholders supported the development of Grid Capacity Allocation Rules, it is thus appropriate to make the decision set out above.

ATTACHMENTS:

Annexure A: Grid Capacity Allocation Rules

Annexure C: Detailed Stakeholder Comments